Chicago-Kent Law Review
Volume 56

Issue 1

Article 15

April 1980

Taxation: Has the Time Come for a National Tax Court
Theodore Berger

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Theodore Berger, Taxation: Has the Time Come for a National Tax Court , 56 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 381 (1980).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol56/iss1/15

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT
Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu,
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu.

TAXATION: HAS THE TIME COME FOR A
NATIONAL TAX COURT?.
THEODORE BERGER*

The concept of a national court of tax appeals, which has long
been discussed, received its strongest impetus this year. Senator Kennedy, as chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, introduced the
Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1979.' This legislation would establish a United States Court of Tax Appeals to have exclusive review
jurisdiction in civil tax matters. 2 Jurisdiction of these cases would be
removed from the other courts of appeals.3 The, bill also removes the
trial jurisdiction of the Court of Claims in tax matters.4 Thus, the
United States Tax Court and the district courts would continue to share
original jurisdiction of civil tax cases at the trial level.5 With a single
reviewing court, there would no longer be the possibility of a conflict in
decisions at the appellate level. Consequently, since conflict among the
circuit courts has been the principal ground for the United States
Supreme Court's grant of certiorari in tax cases, 6 it can be anticipated
that very few tax cases would reach the Supreme Court should the legislation be enacted into law.
The purposes for establishing a single reviewing court are to relieve the presently overburdened courts of appeal and, more importantly, to provide certainty and uniformity of interpretation of Internal
Revenue Code provisions. 7 Especially relevant to this article are the
conflicting views of supporters of a national court regarding the selection of judges for the court. 8 Senator Kennedy's bill envisions a rotat* Partner, Arnstein, Gluck, Weitzenfeld & Minow; B.S., Northwestern University; J.D.,
New York University.
I. S. 383, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 101-510 (1979).
2. Id. §§ 401,407.
3. Id.§ 404.
4. Id. § 341.
5. The United States Tax Court has jurisdiction under 26 U.S.C. § 7442 (1976) to review
proposed deficiencies. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1976), the district courts and the Court of Claims
have concurrent jurisdiction in tax refund suits.
6. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Binder, 369 U.S. 499 (1972).
7. It may be of some interest to note that a questionnaire circulated among tax practitioners
attending a meeting of the American Bar Association Section of Taxation in Washington, D.C. on
May 19, 1979 voted 99 to 45 against establishment of a national court of tax appeals. See
Redman, Chairman'sReport, 32 TAX LAw. 877 (1979).
8. The group of practitioners referred to in note 7 supra voted 100 to 38 in favor of permanent judges in the event a national court of tax appeals was established.
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ing panel of twelve judges taken from the other courts of appeals, each
to serve a three year term.9 While approving the principle of a national
reviewing court, the Department of the Treasury prefers a court composed of permanent judges which might be augmented from time to
time by judges from other courts of appeal. l°
The preference for rotating or permanent judges would reflect a
prediction as to the type of tax cases likely to reach the docket of the
national appeals court. Many tax cases require a common law approach to decision-making; for example, questions of when seemingly
separate steps would be deemed part of a single transaction. Presumably, regular circuit court judges would be well qualified to decide such
issues. Other cases would involve the complex interplay of Internal
Revenue CodeI ! provisions, a skill and expertise perhaps best developed by permanent judges.
Both types of cases are now handled by the circuit courts of appeals. Therefore, it is interesting in reviewing the tax decisions of the
Seventh Circuit this past year' 2 to consider whether appellate judges
specializing in tax cases might have followed a different approach.
The number of tax decisions handed down by the Seventh Circuit
during 1978-79 is perhaps too small a sample to reach precise conclusions regarding the direction of the court. Moreover, even this small
sample represents the work of different panels of the court. Of the
cases to be discussed, Crown v. Commissioner,13 Ferris v. Commissioner,14 and Estate of Jenner v. Commissioner 5 each required interpretation of a single code provision.16 Consequently, the reviewing court
was able to fall back on those principles of common sense which supposedly underpin the common law. On the other hand, the decision in
Koehring Co. v. United States 7 exemplifies the tangled statutory web
which must often be penetrated to reach a decision in a tax case. The
latter type of case may become more common as Congress enacts ever
more complex code provisions.
9. S. 383, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 402 (1979).
10. For a further discussion of this proposed legislation, see Caplin & Brown, A New United
States Court of Tax Appeals. S.678, 57 TAXES 360 (1979).
!1. Hereinafter referred to as the code. References made to the code are to the Internal
Revenue code of 1954, as amended.
12. Cases reviewed in this article are those decided from June I, 1978 through May 31, 1979.
13. 585 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1978).
14. 582 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1978).
15. 577 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1978).
16. 583 F.2d 313 (7th Cir. 1978).
17. 585 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1978).
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INTEREST-FREE LOANS TO FAMILY MEMBERS

Unquestionably, the most important case decided by the Seventh
Circuit in the past year was the gift tax case of Crown v. Commissioner.'8 Crown involved the fundamental question of whether interest-free loans to family members represented taxable gifts. The
taxpayer and his two brothers were partners in a partnership which
made loans totaling approximately $18 million to a series of trusts
which had been established for the benefit of the children and other
relatives of the brothers. These loans were used by the trusts to acquire
interests in another investment partnership. Most of the loans were on
open account and some were represented by demand notes payable.
No provision was made for the payment of interest, and none was paid.
The Commissioner asserted gift tax deficiencies against each of the
partners. 19 This was based on the determination that interest-free loans
by the partnership represented taxable gifts by each of the partners to
the extent of the interest value which might have been charged. The
Commissioner used a six percent interest rate applied to the daily balance of loans outstanding during the year to compute the amount of the
20
gift.
The applicable provisions of the gift tax statute are very broadly
worded. Section 250121 of the code imposes a gift tax on any transfer of
property by gift and section 2512(b) 22 provides that where property is
transferred for less than full and adequate consideration, the amount
by which the value of the property exceeds the value of consideration
shall be deemed a gift. Before the Tax Court, the Commissioner argued that a loan made without interest is a transfer of property at less
than the true economic value. In other words, the lender has foregone
the opportunity cost of the money and, to that extent, the lender makes
a gift to the borrower.
With four judges dissenting, the Tax Court held for the taxpayer, 23
finding that the interest-free loans in Crown were non-taxable events
under the gift tax statute. 24 The court noted that another tax case,
18. 582 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1978).
19. Crown involved loans outstanding in 1967. Gift tax returns were required to be filed for
the calendar year prior to 1971. After 1970, the returns are to be filed quarterly. Where quarterly
returns are to be filed, the computation would reflect loans outstanding during the quarter.
20. The Commissioner also contended in an income tax proceeding not related to this appeal
that the imputed interest represented taxable income to the partners. 585 F.2d at 236 n.3.
21. I.R.C. § 2501.
22. Id. § 2512(b).
23. 67 T.C. 1060 (1977).
24. Id.
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Johnson v. United States,25 which held in the taxpayer's favor, was directly on point. The Crown court was also influenced by other income
tax decisions 26 which held that no income was to be imputed simply
because funds were being advanced without payment of interest. The
Tax Court extended the principle by analogy to the gift tax area because the court was reluctant to upset an understanding of the law
which had persisted for years. 27 The dissenting judges in Crown, on the
other hand, found the economic advantage of such loans to be within
the broad sweep of the gift tax statute. 28 The Commissioner appealed
to the Seventh Circuit.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the decision of the Tax Court. In so
doing, the Seventh Circuit rendered an opinion that was more analytical than that of the Tax Court. The Seventh Circuit was disturbed both
by the technical problem of whether there had been a transfer of a
property right within the meaning of code section 250129 and by the
practical problem of valuing the gift. These two aspects fuse because
the approach to valuation follows from the determination of what
rights, if any, had been transferred. If the making of the loan created a
present right or interest in favor of the borrower, it would seem to follow that its value should be measurable at the time of the loan. If the
property right is the right to the indefinite use of the money, 30 analogous to a tenancy at will, it would have to be shown that such right has
an exchangeable value. Alternatively, if the gift is completed by the
lender's failure to demand payment, the gift is continuous; its value is
measured continuously during the period of time the loan is outstanding, and the tax is computed for each segment within this total period
of time for which a gift tax return would be filed. 3 1
The Seventh Circuit in Crown restated the Commissioner's argu-

25. 254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966).
26. Saunders v. United States, 294 F. Supp. 1276 (D. Hawaii 1968), rev'don other grounds,
450 F.2d 1047 (9th Cir. 1971); J. Simpson Dean, 35 T.C. 1083 (1961).
27. The failure of the government to appeal the adverse decision in Johnson v. United States,
254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966), may have led to this supposed understanding of the law.
28. 585 F.2d at 241-42.
29. I.R.C. § 2501.
30. The loans were made to permit the trusts to enter into certain investments. While the
court does not suggest it, there might have been found to be an implicit understanding that no
demand would be made on the notes until these investments had generated sufficient income. The
trusts presumably would not have been able to satisfy any demand before this time.
* 31. Under present law, gift tax returns need not be filed for a particular quarter until the
quarter in which taxable gifts for the calendar year exceed $25,000 or after the fourth quarter if
this limitation has not been met. See I.R.C. § 6075(b).
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ment to be that the lender has constructively received 32 an interest payment which the lender then constructively transfers to the borrower.
Under this view, the lender is being taxed on what he could have done
rather than what he did. Further, the court noted that since the principal of the note was recoverable on demand, there would be no diminution of the estate tax otherwise payable on the lender's death. Thus,
since the prime function of the gift tax is to prevent avoidance of estate
did not necessarily
tax, 33 the Seventh Circuit concluded that Congress
34
intend to apply the gift tax in this situation.
The Seventh Circuit was not altogether satisfied with the result in
Crown and, as a result, more or less invited the Commissioner to
change the regulations under section 2501.35 Specifically, the court
wanted the Commissioner to determine that the imputed interest element of an interest-free loan constitutes a gift, or perhaps the Commissioner would encourage Congress to change the statute to that effect.
While the Seventh Circuit was concerned that the taxing authorities
had not consistently asserted a gift tax in this situation, the Commis36
sioner had failed to appeal the only decision squarely on point.
Therefore, it is difficult to understand how a change in regulations
37
would affect interpretation of the statute.
The Honorable Robert Van Pelt, senior district judge for the District of Nebraska, sitting by designation, wrote the dissenting opinion
in Crown.38 Judge Van Pelt relied on legislative history 39 which provided for a broad application of the gift tax statutes. Judge Van Pelt
concluded his dissenting opinion with the feeling that the decision of
' '40
the majority "just ain't right.
The difficulty which the Crown court had in determining the
amount of the gift in the case of demand loans is not present where the
notes are for a fixed term. There may be some difficulty in establishing
the fair market value at which notes of this character might trade.
However, if an interest rate can be assumed and the term is known, it is
32. Constructive receipt has a somewhat different connotation in income tax law. It refers to
a receipt of cash, available to a taxpayer for the asking. See Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2 (1957).
33. There would, however, be a reduction in the estate by the amount of interest income
foregone. This was the only amount which the Commissioner sought to subject to gift tax.
34. 585 F.2d at 238.
35.

36.
37.
I.R.C. §
38.
39.
40.

I.R.C. § 2501. See 585 F.2d at 241.

Johnson v. United States, 254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966).
By way of contrast, some regulations are intended to have legislative effect. See, e.g.,
1502 and the regulations thereunder.
585 F.2d at 241-42.
Id. at 241.
Id. at 242.
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possible to compute the appropriate discount. For example, a five year
interest-free note should have a value of about sixty-eight percent of
the face amount where the appropriate interest rate is eight percent and
the value of the gift upon making the note would thus be thirty-two
percent of face value. Crown has already been distinguished in a situation involving term notes, and unlike Crown, the court found that a
4
taxable event had occurred. '
There are indications that the Commissioner will take up the invitation to change the regulation. It will be interesting to see whether
other circuits follow the Seventh Circuit or will be influenced by a more
specific regulation, or indeed, whether the Seventh Circuit itself will
42
change its view in the light of a specific regulation.
RETROACTIVE DISQUALIFICATION OF A PROFIT SHARING PLAN

If in Crown the Seventh Circuit seemed to bend over backward to
reach a result favorable to the taxpayer, in Wisconsin Nipple &
FabricatingCorp. v. Commissioner,4 3 the court, without much thought,
reached an unusually harsh result against the taxpayer. In Wisconsin
NoMpe, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the Tax Court" and approved the
action of the Commissioner in retroactively disqualifying a company's
45
profit sharing plan.
The facts in Wisconsin Nipple are relatively straightforward. In
1960, the taxpayer had established a profit sharing plan covering only
salaried employees and excluding hourly paid employees who apparently had indicated a preference for receiving a cash bonus rather than
participating in a deferred compensation plan. The four salaried employees who participated included two officers who were relatively
highly paid. The two lower-paid salaried employees were only marginally above some of the fifteen excluded employees in compensation.
The Internal Revenue Service approved this plan with a favorable determination letter which, briefly stated, means that the plan qualifies
for the favorable tax treatment of a current tax deduction 46 for the em41. Estate of Berkman v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 183 (1979).
42. For further discussion of the Crown case, see Edwards, Whai PlanningOpportunitiesDoes
CA-7's No-Gift-Tax Holding in Crown Open Up? 50 J. TAX. 168 (1979).
43. 581 F.2d 1235 (7th Cir. 1978).
44. 67 T.C. 490 (1976).
45. Under I.R.C. § 401, a plan is qualified if it meets the requirements of that section, principally relating to nondiscrimination in favor of officers, supervisors and highly compensated employees.
46. See I.R.C. § 404.
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ployer coupled with tax deferment for the employees. 47 In 1962, another determination letter was sought as a result of an amendment to
the plan, and again a favorable determination was received by the taxpayer.
During 1973, an Internal Revenue Service agent examined the
plan and raised a question about the failure to include hourly employees. In 1971 and 1972, there were six salaried employees participating
in the plan and fifteen hourly employees not participating. The participating employees were in general the highest paid employees, although
the compensation of many of the excluded hourly employees was close
to that of the two lowest compensated of the participants. That same
year, the company amended the plan, effective beginning in 1973, to
include hourly employees, substituting participation in the plan for
their cash bonus. Nevertheless, in 1974, the Internal Revenue Service
informed the taxpayer that it was retroactively revoking qualification of
the plan for 1971 and 1972, that is, as it stood before the 1973 amendment. The Commissioner's action was based on a revenue ruling48
which described a similar situation in which a plan was found not to be
qualified.
The Tax Court in Wisconsin Nipple held that the Commissioner's
action was proper.49 The ruling followed a revenue procedure 50 which
placed the responsibility on employers to conform to all such rulings by
amending their plans before the end of the year following the one in
which the ruling was issued. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the Tax
Court's decision. 5 '
Retroactive disqualification of a profit sharing plan affects the
taxes of both the employing corporation and the participating employees.5 2 According to many attorneys handling such matters before the
Internal Revenue Service, it is highly unusual for a plan to be disqualified and almost unheard of for the disqualification to be applied retroactively. It is hard to understand how the taxpayer in Wisconsin Npple
found itself in this unfortunate situation since there is nothing in the
record to indicate any bad faith on its part. The standard of requiring a
taxpayer promptly to conform to a ruling which might affect its qualifi47. See id. § 402.
48. Rev. Rul. 69-398, 1969-2 C.B. 58.
49. 67 T.C. at 495.
50. Rev. Rule 72-6, 1972-1 C.B. 710.
51. 581 F.2d at 1241.
52. In general, if a plan is not qualified, deductions for contributions are allowable to the
employer only to the extent benefits are nonforfeitable, and the employee is similarly taxed in the
current year.
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cation is totally unrealistic. Numerous rulings are issued every year
and the applicability of many is not immediately clear. Since the en53
actment of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,
the requirements for conforming to the law have been exceptionally
difficult and the Internal Revenue Service has been quite generous in
permitting taxpayers adequate time to conform. Since retroactive disqualification in Wisconsin Nipple was not necessary to protect revenue,
the result seems harsh. Yet, to a reviewing court, there was probably
no choice but to affirm the lower court since the power of the Commissioner to take retroactive action is legally unquestionable.5 4
A

SPECIAL LIMITATION FOR MEDICAL EXPENSES
WHICH ARE CAPITAL IN NATURE

Ferris v. Commissioner55 presents a situation involving a rather
narrow application of code provisions. Ferrisis worth examining, however, for the approach taken by the Seventh Circuit. The Ferrises resided in a luxurious house, reflecting a very high standard of material
and workmanship. The house was constructed in the English Tudor
style of hand-laid and hand-cut stone with servants' quarters and other
amenities. In 1970, Mrs. Ferris began to experience difficulty in walking or sitting as a result of a degenerative spinal disorder. Her physician recommended that they install a swimming pool at their residence
and that Mrs. Ferris use it regularly to prevent the onset of permanent
paralysis.
The Ferrises thereupon constructed a pool area attached to their
home, reproducing the stone, roofing and interior design of the residence so as to blend in architecturally with the building. They also
included certain other entertainment facilities in this area. The entire
addition cost $195,000. In their tax return, the taxpayers first reduced
this amount by about $22,000 allocable to the other entertainment facilities and then divided the balance of cost approximately in half
which their appraiser had estimated was the increased value of the
property, resulting in a medical expense of $86,000 taken on the return.
Capital expenditures generally are not deductible for federal income tax purposes; 56 however, Treasury regulations have long recognized that an improvement may nevertheless qualify as a deductible
53. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829, codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1976).
54. See Comment, Limits on Retroactive Decision Making by the Internal Revenue Service
Redfning Abuse of Discretion Under Section 7805(b), 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 529 (1976).
55. 582 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1978).
56. I.R.C. § 263.
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medical expense to the extent the expenditure does not increase the
value of the related property. 57 The position taken by the Ferrises on
their tax return purported to follow this regulation. The Ferrises computed that portion of their capital expenditure made for a medical need
that was in excess of the value added to the property as a medical expense. The Tax Court, with some slight adjustments, held for the taxpayer. 5 8 The Commissioner appealed to the Seventh Circuit.
Although there was evidence in the record of the appraiser's estimate of the amount by which this swimming pool addition increased
the value of the property, on review the Seventh Circuit did not stop
there but felt it necessary to take an additional step to determine if the
remaining portion was directly related to medical care. 59 The Seventh
Circuit noted:
The task in cases like this one is to determine the minimum reasonable cost of a functionally adequate pool and housing structure.
Taxpayers may well decide to exceed that cost and construct a facility more in keeping with their tastes, but any costs above those necessary to produce60a functionally adequate facility are not incurred "for
medical care".
The Seventh Circuit remanded the case to the Tax Court for this determination. 6' The Seventh Circuit suggested that the Tax Court could
receive evidence of actual cost of other taxpayers who have constructed
such therapeutic facilities or it could deduct from the taxpayers' actual
cost a sum appropriate to account for the unnecessarily expensive con62
struction which satisfied their personal taste.
Ferris already has been criticized 63 as an unwarranted departure
from the regulations which allow as a deduction the portion of the construction cost which does not increase the value of the property. The
Seventh Circuit in Ferris seemed to carve out a special limitation for
medical expenses which are capital in nature since the court recognized 64 that, in general, taxpayers are not limited in their medical expense deductions to the cheapest form of treatment. Perhaps this
limitation is philosophically justified by the extraordinary circumstance
of permitting a current deduction for a capital expenditure. Since the
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(1)(iii)(1974).
36 T.C.M. (CCH) 765 (1977).
582 F.2d 1116-17.
Id. at 1116.
Id. at 1118.
Id.at 1116-17.
Pusker, The Changing Scope of Medical Expense Deductions, 57 TAXES 347 (1979). But

see Note, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 114 (1979).

64. 582 F.2d at 1116.
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Seventh Circuit conceded the validity of the taxpayers' argument that
an esthetically unharmonious facility might well have reduced the
value of their property, 6 5 the result reached under this standard might
well be close to that reached under the regulation. The court in Ferris
thus established a rule that is difficult to apply since it is based on hypothetical costs and one which creates some confusion on a point that
had been thought to be well settled.
The preceding cases are within the so-called "common law of taxation," calling for interpretation of relatively straightforward provisions of the code. These are, of course, often difficult interpretations,
but usually do not require extensive tax expertise. The most cogent
argument for a national reviewing court for tax cases is that specialized
judges will best cope with those cases that involve the most technical
provisions of the code. The Seventh Circuit was confronted with several such technical cases during 1978-79.
DEFINING CONTROLLED FOREIGN CORPORATIONS

In 1962, Congress enacted an extremely complex set of provisions 66 which, in effect, taxes the income of certain subsidiaries directly
to the parent corporation. 67 The provisions were a congressional response to quell the use of foreign tax havens. Central to the imposition
68
of the tax is that the subsidiary be a controlled foreign corporation.
The key element in the definition of a controlled foreign corporation is
that fifty percent of the voting power be in the hands of United States
persons. 69 A company with wholly-owned subsidiaries which would be
covered by this provision attempted to avoid categorization as a controlled foreign corporation by transferring controlling voting power to
an individual or entity which would vote in accordance with the company's wishes. One common device was to create a class of preferred
stock with a small capitalization but carrying majority voting power.
By a variety of techniques, the United States parent retained effective
power to redeem the shares if it became necessary for the parent to
65. Id. at 1118.
66. See I.R.C. § 951.
67. The statutory scheme is far more complex, taxing the shareholder's proportionate share
of subpart F income as defined in I.R.C. § 952, and its proportionate share of increased investment in United States property as determined under I.R.C. § 956.
68. I.R.C. § 957(a).
69. The term "persons" basically includes United States residents and domestic corporations.
I.R.C. § 957(d).

TA XATION

reacquire voting control. 70
In Koehring Co. v. United States,7 1 the Seventh Circuit had the
opportunity to deal with these highly technical provisions. Koehring
involved an attempt by the taxpayer-company 72 to take its foreign sales
73
company out of the classification of a controlled foreign corporation
so as not to be taxed on the subsidiary's undistributed income. The
Koehring case presented a more complex issue than that of simply
avoiding additional tax because Koehring involved an arrangement
which had some business purpose in addition to the purpose of avoiding characterization as a controlled foreign corporation. The taxpayer,
Koehring Co., had a wholly-owned subsidiary, KOS, incorporated in
Panama, which marketed its products. For many years, Koehring also
74
had a relationship with a British company, Newton Chambers Co.,
which had a license to manufacture equipment designed by Koehring,
and to market those products primarily in Europe. Koehring and
Newton Chambers had discussed previously a concept of a jointly
owned international marketing subsidiary.
In 1963, an arrangement was established by which Newton Chambers, for an investment of $440,000, would acquire KOS preferred
stock and have 55 percent of the voting power in KOS. At the same
time, Koehring made a similar investment in the non-voting preferred
stock of a Newton Chambers subsidiary. Newton Chambers thus had
the right to name a majority of the board of directors of KOS, and did
so. However, there were very few meetings of the board. Existing
management was retained; these people were in fact in charge of the
day-to-day operations of KOS, and they were all identified with Koehring. On these facts, the Internal Revenue Service found, and the district court agreed, 75 that the reality of control was left with the
taxpayer, Koehring, and that KOS was a controlled foreign corporation.
The regulations provide that if there is an express or implied
agreement that:
Any shareholder will not vote his stock or will vote it only in specifiedmanner, or that shareholders owning stock having not more than
50 per cent of the total combined voting power will exercise power
70. See, e.g., Garlock, Inc. v. Commissioner, 489 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 911 (1974).
71. 583 F.2d 313 (7th Cir. 1978).
72. Hereinafter referred to as Koehring or the company.
73. 1.R.C. § 957.
74. Hereinafter referred to as Newton Chambers.
75. 433 F. Supp. 929 (E.D. Wis. 1977).
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normally possessed by a majority of the stockholders, then the nominal ownership of the voting power will be disregarded in determining
which shareholders actually hold such voting power .... 76
The regulations' further provide that if the voting power of a class of
stock is substantially greater than its share of the earnings or if the facts
indicate that the shareholders of this class do not exercise their voting
rights independently, the voting power of that class of stock then will
77
be disregarded.
Since the taxpayer did not challenge the validity of the regulations,
it was entirely a question of fact whether any express or implied arrangement existed in Koehring. Under the circumstances, the Seventh
Circuit might well have affirmed the finding of the district court under
the clearly erroneous rule. 78 Instead, the Seventh Circuit chose to examine the issue at some length. The court's analysis reveals a sophisticated understanding of business matters. The court recognized 79 that
the cross-investment by Koehring in a Newton Chambers subsidiary
largely mitigated the circumstance of Newton Chambers having made
a substantial investment in KOS. The Seventh Circuit also recognized
the reality that the business relationship was such that Newton Chambers would not find it wise to exercise independent management control. 80 Koehring pointed to several instances of Newton Chambers
supposedly exercising its control of KOS, but on analysis, these proved
to be illusory. Koehring also emphasized that the Newton Chambers'
directors had prevented payment of a dividend from KOS. However,
there was actually a community of interest here because Newton
Chambers' desire to retain funds in KOS for the eventual redemption
of its preferred stock coincided with Koehring's tax advantage in
avoiding a dividend.8 ' In sum, the opinion reflects well on the ability
of a general appeals court to consider complicated tax issues.
A

WRIT OF MANDAMUS IN A TAX CASE

The Seventh Circuit was on less sure ground when it ordered mandamus in Vishnevsky v. United Slates.82 However, the court was careful
to limit its decision to the particular facts of the case. 83 On July 10,
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
which it
82.
83.

Treas. Reg. § 1.957-1(b)(2) (1963).
Id.
FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
583 F.2d at 320.
Id. at 322.
Koehring would hardly have wanted to pay a dividend and thus destroy the tax deferral
sought to preserve.
581 F.2d 1249 (7th Cir. 1978).
Id. at 1257.
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1972, the taxpayers received a deficiency notice stating certain proposed deficiencies for 1966, 1967, 1969 and 1970 and an overassessment
of $1,400 for 1965. The letter also stated that when a final determination was made on the deficiencies proposed, the overassessment would
be scheduled for adjustment to the extent allowable and applied as set
84
forth in section 6402 of the Internal Revenue Code.
The taxpayer in Vishnevsky appealed the proposed deficiencies to
the Tax Court and at least a portion of the deficiencies were sustained
in a decision rendered in September 1974. 8. When they then sought to
have their 1965 overpayment offset against that liability, the Internal
Revenue Service refused. The period for filing a refund claim for 1965
86
had expired in 1973 while the Tax Court proceedings were pending
and the taxpayers, relying on the July 10, 1972 letter, had failed to file a
claim for refund. The district director of the Internal Revenue Service
took the position that the failure to file the claim deprived him of au87
thority to apply the overassessment as a credit.
Although the taxpayer in Vishnevsky filed suit for mandamus rethe district court treated the suit as for a tax refund 89 and granted
summary judgment to the government 90 without considering the propriety of mandamus. The Seventh Circuit considered the mandamus
question for the first time, and found itself able to resolve the question
without a remand since all of the facts were on record. The court noted
that, while the act of determining whether there has been an overpayment is an act of discretion which could not be the subject of mandamus, 9' in Vishnevsky, the fact and amount of overpayment have
already been determined and it is a ministerial duty of the district director of the Internal Revenue Service to make the credit.
In opposing mandamus, the government argued that while the suit
was nominally against government officials calling for a payment from
the public treasury, in actuality the suit operated against the sovereign
and therefore was subject to sovereign immunity. 92 The government
lief,88

84 Id. at 1250.
85. John Vishnevsky, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 1136 (1974).
86. See I.R.C. § 6511(2)(a).
87. See id. § 6511(b)(1) (1976).
88. See 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1976). This provision grants original jurisdiction to the district
courts "of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United
States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff." Id.
89. 418 F. Supp. 698 (E.D. Wis. 1976).
90. Summary judgment was granted under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) (1976) rather than under
28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1976).
91. Kalb v. United States, 505 F.2d 506 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 979 (1975).
92. See Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963).
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had waived sovereign immunity only in tax refund suits where a claim
had been properly filed. 93 However, the court observed that in several
cases 94 the Supreme Court has allowed mandamus to compel federal
officers to pay money where the duty to do so was clearly ministerial.
Furthermore, the fact that jurisdiction for mandamus relief is granted
to the district courts 9 5 also evidenced a waiver of sovereign immunity.
The result in Vishnevsky is tied to the unique facts of the case. The
Seventh Circuit in Vishnevsky disavowed any intention of encouraging
mandamus actions. 96 Certainly, Vishnevsky is not likely to open a
floodgate of mandamus litigation in tax matters since there are very
few cases where this relief could be appropriate. Yet, until Vishnevsky,
most tax lawyers would have assumed mandamus would never be
available in refund cases because the requirement of filing a claim is
jurisdictional. This is essentially the point made by Judge Tone in a
dissenting opinion in Vishnevsky. 97 Judge Tone pointed out that if the
taxpayers had complied with the procedural prerequisites of filing a
claim for refund, the relief would not have been available. The fact
that they were misled by the district director's letter did not make mandamus an appropriate remedy when it would not otherwise have been
available. It is surprising that in a hardship case such as this, the district court was not able to find an informal claim for refund in some of
the taxpayer's correspondence, and thus avoid the jurisdictional issue. 98
AN UNDERWRITER'S FEE AS AN ESTATE TAX DEDUCTION

In Estate of Jenner v. Commissioner,9 9 the Seventh Circuit followed the precedent set by the Ninth Circuit'0° and allowed an underwriting fee as an estate tax deduction.' 0 ' A large part of the decedent's
estate consisted of stock of a publicly traded company, Baker, Fentress
Co., 0 2 and the estate's holdings represented more than eleven percent
93. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1976), as construed in Chapman v. United States, 485 F.2d 1194
(9th Cir. 1973).
Miguel v. McCarl, 291 U.S. 422 (1934); Mellon v. Orinoco Iron Co., 266 U.S.
94. See, e.g.,
121 (1924).
95. See 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1976).
96. 581 F.2d at 1257.
97. Id. at 1257-58.
98. Some courts have been quite liberal in piecing together informal correspondence from
the taxpayer to the Internal Revenue Service as constituting an informal claim for refund. See,
e.g., Tobin v. Tomlinson, 310 F.2d 648, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1962)(Jones J., dissenting); Newton v.
United States, 163 F. Supp. 614 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
99. 577 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1978).
100. Estate of Joslyn v. Commissioner, 566 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1977).
101. See I.R.C. § 2053 (a)(2) (allows administration expenses as a deduction).
102. Hereinafter referred to as B-F.
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of the stock outstanding. During the course of administration, the executor determined that it would have to raise an additional $6 to $9
million in cash to satisfy debts and taxes and to make distributions to
the beneficiaries. Because the estate's shares of B-F stock represented
such a large block of the outstanding stock of that company, the executor determined that the stock could only be sold through a registered
secondary offering, rather than by direct transactions on the over-thecounter market.
According to the terms of the underwriting agreement, the estate
agreed to deliver to the underwriters 300,000 B-F shares and the underwriter agreed to pay the estate $38.85 a share. The estate was also obligated to pay costs and expenses of the registration. The stock was
offered to the public at $42 a share. The $3.15 a share difference between the price paid by the public and the proceeds to the estate was
described as an underwriting discount. In settlement, the underwriter
delivered to the executor a check for $12.6 million representing the $42
per share paid by the public. The executor in return delivered to the
underwriter a check for $945,000 representing the underwriting discount.
Following its own precedent, 0 3 the Tax Court determined that the
discount could not be deducted from the estate tax. The Tax Court
held that the substance of the transaction was a sale to the underwriter
at $38.85 per share and that the check for $945,000 to the underwriter
was a mere paper transaction which could not be transmuted into a
deductible expense.' 0 4
The Seventh Circuit reversed. 0 5 The court pointed out that if the
underwriters had entered into a "best efforts" offering 0 6 in which they
had no firm commitment to buy the stock from the estate, the fee
earned by the underwriter would be a deductible expense. The Seventh
Circuit did not think a distinction should be made where the underwriters were under a firm commitment to sell the stock at a fixed price.
The result reached by the court in Jenner gives the taxpayer what
amounts to a double deduction. In valuing the stock as part of the
gross estate, consideration is given to the fact that such a large block of
103. The United States Tax Court is not bound by contrary decisions of the courts of appeals
outside the circuit in which the taxpayer resides. In Jack E. Golsen, 64 T.C. 742 (1970), 445 F.2d
985 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971), the Tax Court adopted the policy of following precedents established by the circuit to which the case could be appealed.
104. See Estate of Joslyn v. Commissioner, 566 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1977).
105. Estate of Jenner v. Commissioner, 577 F.2d 1100, 1107 (7th Cir. 1978).
106. In a best efforts offering, the underwriters agree only to use their best efforts to sell the
stock to the public at a favorable price. See id. at 1102 n.3.
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stock is held that it cannot readily be sold in an ordinary transaction. 0 7
This so-called blockage rule 0 8 justifies a deduction of the value to reflect the fact that disposition of the stock could likely be effected only
by reducing the price below quoted market values. The estate therefore
received both a reduction in value for blockage and the deduction of
the underwriting expenses as an administration expense.
A final point which the court had to consider was that under section 2053(a) of the code, administrative expenses are deductible only
where they are necessarily incurred in the administration of the estate. 10 9 State law controls in determining when a sale is necessary for
the proper administration of the estate. 0 In Jenner, the probate court
did not directly approve the sale but the executor submitted an accounting to the probate court which showed the $945,000 as an underwriting discount. The probate court's approval of the accounting was
determined to be an implicit finding of the necessity of the sale.
PENALTY FOR LATE FILING

In American National Bank & Trust Co. v. United States,"' the
Seventh Circuit dealt with a rather unusual problem in computing the
penalty for late filing of an estate tax return. 1 2 The deceased had
purchased over a million dollars of insurance, but the insurance companies were contesting payment on the ground that death occurred by
suicide. The executor delayed filing the estate tax return in hope that
the insurance claim would be settled, but when no settlement could be
reached after nearly three years, it filed a return showing no value for
these claims.' '3
The estate eventually received a verdict in its favor. The Internal
Revenue Service, however, contended that the late filing penalty should
be based on the face value of the policies. The district court agreed, but
the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded.' '4 The Seventh Circuit
held that the penalty should be based on the value of the policies as of
the date of death." 5 This penalty could be determined only by weigh107. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(c) (1958) suggesting that selling prices of small blocks of
stock may not reflect fairly the value of a large block.
108. See 577 F.2d at 1103 n.5.
109. I.R.C. § 2053(a).
110. Ballance v. Commissioner, 347 F.2d 419, 423 (7th Cir. 1965).
I11.594 F.2d 1141 (7th Cir. 1979).
112. Under I.R.C. § 6651(a), a penalty of 5% of "the amount required to be shown as tax on
such return" is added for each month of failure to file, with a maximum penalty of 25%.
113. 594 F.2d at 1143.
114. Id.at 1148.
115. Id.
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ing at that date the contingencies of prevailing in the litigation.
CHARITABLE DEDUCTIONS

Bowes v. United States'1 6 involved the determination of the
amount of the charitable deduction allowable to the estate for federal
estate tax purposes. The decedent's will left to a charitable foundation
the entire residue of the estate after certain specific bequests.' 17 The
estate tax is not due until nine months after death." 8 During this period, the estate was able to invest the funds it would need to pay the tax
and under the will the interest earned was added to the residue to be
distributed to the charitable beneficiary. The estate argued, therefore,
that the interest earned after death increased the charitable deduction.
This argument had been rejected by the district court 1 9 and the Seventh Circuit affirmed 20 on reasoning similar to the American National
Bank & Trust Co. v. United States 12 1 case. The estate tax statute looks
to date of death values in determining the amount of the charitable
deduction. The result is not unjust since the estate enjoys an income
22
tax deduction for this income which was distributable to charity.
INVENTORY PRACTICES

Finally, it should be noted that the Seventh Circuit's decision in
Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner123 discussed in last year's Seventh
CircuitReview 124 was affirmed this year by the Supreme Court.' 25 Thor
Power Tool involved the validity for tax purposes of the common accounting practice of writing down excess parts inventory to reflect the
risk of loss attributable to the long period of time before complete disposition of the inventory. The Commissioner had disallowed the write27
26
down and was upheld by the Tax Court and the Seventh Circuit.
The Supreme Court affirmed, largely on the same reasoning as the Sev116. 593 F.2d 272 (7th Cir. 1979).
117. I.R.C. § 2055 permits an unlimited deduction from the taxable estate for amounts distributable to qualified charities.
118. 1.R.C. § 6075(a).
119. See 593 F.2d at 274.
120. Id. at 276.
121. 594 F.2d 1141 (7th Cir. 1979).
122. See I.R.C. § 642(c)(1).
123. 563 F.2d 861 (7th Cir. 1977).
124. Friedberg & Witt, Taxation: The Seventh Circuit'sSearch For Economic Reality, 55 CHI.KENT L. REV. 225, 242-45 (1979).

125. 439 U.S. 522 (1979).
126. 64 T.C. 154 (1975).
127. 563 F.2d 861 (7th Cir. 1977).
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enth Circuit: the requirement of the regulations that a taxpayer's accounting practice clearly reflect income is paramount over the
requirement that it conform to the best accounting practice in the industry. 28 Thus, the Commissioner's determination that the writedown did not meet this test was not clearly erroneous.129 The Internal
Revenue Service has shown an increased interest recently in examining
taxpayers' inventory practices, and it can be expected to apply Thor
30
Power Tool rigorously.
CONCLUSION

It is very difficult to evaluate the Seventh Circuit's performance in
deciding tax cases in light of the original inquiry raised in this article
concerning the wisdom of establishing a national court of tax appeals.
The sample of cases handled in one year is too small to reach any definitive conclusions. Further, this small sample is itself the product of
different panels of judges.' 3' One premise for the national reviewing
court is that a specialized court is needed to deal with the arcane complexities of the Code. The Seventh Circuit has demonstrated its ability
to deal with complex statutory patterns, but it appears that relatively
few tax cases involve this kind of statutory complexity. Most are relatively straightforward questions of statutory construction not too dissimilar from other areas of federal law. The other premise for
establishing a national reviewing court is that it would develop a uniform body of tax jurisprudence. This is a valid consideration since the
Supreme Court reviews few substantive tax cases,13 2 but the premise is
defeated by Congress' constant tinkering with the Code so that no point
of statutory construction can remain settled for long. Perhaps, there is
need for a moratorium on tax legislation to give both the bench and bar
a chance to catch up. Neither specialized judges nor specialized practitioners can be expected to cope with the flood of legislation that has
been passed in the last few years.
128. 439 U.S. at 539. See Treas. Reg. § 1.471-2 (1973).
129. 439 U.S. at 541. See 563 F.2d at 867.
130. For further discussion of the Thor Power Tool decision, see Dasburg, Porche & Hannery,
Inventory Valuation After Thor Power: Analyzing the Supreme Court Decision, 50 J. TAX. 200
(1979); Mikalov, Inventory Write-Downs & Thor Power Tool, 57 TAXES 384 (1979).
131. Of the eight cases discussed herein, Judge Pell sat on four panels, Judges Sprecher and
Wood on three, and no other circuit judge sat on more than two panels.
132. In the October 1978 term, the Supreme Court decided only three substantive federal tax
cases. See National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979); Thor Power Tool
Co. v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522 (1979); United California Bank v. United States, 439 U.S. 180
(1978).
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